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Abstract 
 
In this article we analyse in a new way the epistemological concept of mythical 
explanation. It is shown, within the framework of the theory of dynamic and 
complex systems, that this kind of explanation is grounded on the substitution of 
distributed causation by lineal and single causes. Considering four examples, we 
show which mechanism is operating in that substitution. The first one concerns a 
computational implementation of a racial segregation model. The second one will 
be the analysis of an imaginary panic. The third one starts with the theory, 
developed by René Girard, concerning sacrifice rituals and the emergence of 
scapegoats. Finally, the fourth one is based on the introduction of the imitation 
mechanism as an explanation for the financial markets behavior.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Common sense often states that certain explanations are an illusion, in the 
sense that they are a ‘myth’. On the other hand, theoretical reasoning wants to 
discard anything that could be called a mythical explanation. Both common sense 
and science make, however, an extensive use of that kind of explanation, and in 
fact the word ‘myth’ does not necessarily mean ‘illusion '. It can be understood as 
a mechanism due to a condition of the individuals: its bounded rationality. If it is 
an illusion, its meaning approaches what Kant called a ‘transcendental illusion’, 
an illusion that is a necessary one.  
More precisely, that is the condition which states that the actions exercised by 
the individuals upon each other are local actions; each individual acts in function 
of the behavior of the neighbours with which he is in a direct contact. We will 
show that this condition implies that the aggregate of each individual local action 
cannot be represented by any of them: that global aggregate is external to all. Each 
individual is ‘myopic’, he has a ‘short horizon’, and he has, continuing with the 
spatial metaphors, an extremely limited vision of the wide scale consequences of 
his actions.  
The purpose of this article is not to analyse the structure of certain myths as 
pursued in fields such as ethnology, anthropology or mythology. It is rather to 
analyse the structure and epistemic function of what will be defined as a mythical 
explanation. The main argument will be guided by the theory of dynamic and 
complex systems. Within that framework it is possible to make the computational 
synthesis of the local/global dialectic. More precisely, we will start with what is 
usually designated by agent-based models (cf., for example, Epstein and Axtell 
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1997, Axelrod 1997, Cederman 1997, Arthur 1997, LeBaron 1999). In order to 
achieve the definition of mythical explanation, an implementation will be exposed 
of what was perhaps the first example of computational synthesis in the spirit of 
agent-based modeling, Schelling’s model of segregation. That example can be 
used as a step to show that a mythical explanation consists in the replacement of a 
local and distributed causation by what, since Aristotle, is called an efficient 
causation. That idea will then be developed with the analysis of panic. A further 
illustration of the main elements of mythical explanations will be based on René 
Girard’s work, showing how Girard’s theory fits within the framework of 
dynamic systems theory. Finally, we will see how the financial markets, as 
complex systems, can provide a last example of the mythical replacement of local 
causation by a global single cause. 
Agent-based models and concept of mythical 
explanation  
 
We begin with a particular implementation of Shelling’s model of segregation 
(Schelling 1971). The model can be represented in a network composed by 
automata or agents that can assume two states corresponding to their ‘race ' or 
color: either G (grizzly) or W (White). The behavior of each agent is local, which 
means that each one receives the influence off - and influences - eight other 
neighbour agents. That ‘influence' can be understood as an ‘incitement to move', 
that is, each agent possesses ‘movement ' and he moves (or not) from his position 
to another one, according to the proportion of individuals of his color located 
within his defined ray of neighborhood. We can specify the value of 37% of 
neighbours that can induce an agent to move. More specifically, the algorithm that 
implements Schelling’s model can be expressed like this:  
 
• Each individual calculates the number of neighbours of his color (with eight 
agents as the ray of neighborhood). 
• If that number is less than 37% (that is, if more than 63% are of opposite 
color), he moves to a place randomly chosen that satisfies that condition of 
preference; otherwise, he does not move. 
 
And that’s all. It is indeed a very simple algorithm. In our implementation of 
the model we start with an initial random population of agents.1 The iteration of 
the algorithm leads the system to an invariant final configuration, a fixed point.2 
That configuration clearly shows a segregation situation: groups with grizzly 
elements clearly separated by groups of white elements (cf. Figure 1).  
 
                                                          
1A more complete mathematical analysis of Schelling’s model can be found in 
Alves, C., Machuco Rosa, A., Antão, A., N., ‘Distributed Causation and 
Emergence in Finite Models’, Interact, 1: http://www.interact.pt. The 
implementation of the model can also be run on line at that URL. 
2 In informal terms, we recall that a fixed point is a point that verifies the 
equation f(X)=X, where X designates the vector of the states of the system, and 
that a fixed point is stable when it remains invariant under the action of small 
perturbations. Otherwise, the fixed point is unstable; an unstable fixed point is 
also called a critical point. 
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Figure 1: The Schelling’s model defined in a network with 50 * 50 agents, 
with 509 grizzly and 1991 white. The first diagram represents an initial 
random distribution. The second one represents the state of the system after 
45 iterations. The third one is the invariant final state reached after 201 
iterations.  
 
It is important to notice that the agents of the model are interdependent and that 
they interact in a nonlinear way, that is the global behavior of the system cannot 
be obtained by the independent sum of the behavior of each agent. It follows that 
the local analysis of the model, taking each one of its parts separately, does not 
allow to foresee its future evolution. That is the situation of the agents that the 
model is supposed to represent: as we assumed them to be myopic, they can just 
represent isolated parts of the system, and therefore none of them can foresee the 
final state to which the system converges. Therefore, no agent can anticipate the 
wide scale consequences of his behavior. But one could anticipate (to prove) what 
the computational simulation clearly shows: the state of complete integration 
corresponds to an unstable situation, while the state of segregation corresponds to 
a stable fixed point. Therefore, starting from an initial random state, a pattern or 
global order emerges, which, we stress again, cannot be deduced from the isolated 
behavior of an agent or subset of agents  
We are not arguing that the model explains the empirical reality of segregation; 
our main concern is to underline that it illustrates a dynamic process in which the 
final state is the aggregate and non-intentional effect of many nonlinear 
interactions, a dynamic that will be seen as foundation for mythical explanations. 
Notice again that the effect (global segregation) is really non-intentional, given 
the fact that the rule of the model is non-segregationist. What is then the cause of 
the segregation? In a certain sense, at least in the sense more commonly attributed 
to the concept of causation, the cause does not exist. The cause is a distributed 
causation, not present in any isolated part of the system. In agreement to the spirit 
of the theory of complex systems we will name it: distributed causation. It is no 
more than the result of the multiple nonlinear interactions among the elements of 
the system. As it is shown in the simulation, it is not present in any agent or 
individual taken separately, and therefore cannot be represented or identified by 
any of them. 
It is a type of cause that we are not used to associate with the word and concept 
of causation. This is not a surprise. In fact, the hypothesis that we advance here is 
that the causes more easily understood by us are the Aristotelian causes: the 
formal causation, the material causation, the efficient causation and the final 
causation. Leaving aside the formal cause, for which the interpretation is not 
always very clear, we now recall the main characteristics of these causes:  
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Material causation – that from which one thing comes and that makes it 
persist, i.e. the material from which one thing is made.  
Efficient causation – the primary cause of rest and change, i.e. the thing or agent 
responsible for the change in the form of a certain body, as in the case of the 
sculptor and the statue. This definition does not necessarily mean that the change 
must occur by direct physical contact.  
Final causation – the purpose for which one thing is made, as when a knife is 
used to cut some desired food.  
 
These causes may be resumed by the conception of an individual (considered 
almost in isolation) that is the cause modifying some object (efficient causation), 
eventually as a mean to an end (final causation). Notice that, among the three 
causes, the efficient causation is the primordial type of causation, and it is a kind 
of local causation.  
Clearly the distributed causation is not mentioned. In fact, the difficulty to 
understand that kind of causation can be traced to a situation illustrated by 
Schelling’s model: an individual that is ‘myopic’, has ‘short vision’, cannot 
represent a distributed causation because this causation is beyond his horizon of 
accessibility. Only a theoretical elaboration, or a computational synthesis, when 
we have a global representation of the reality that the model describes, gives 
access to a distributed causation. 
However, as we will stress again, it is known that intelligibility is always 
searched. How? The fundamental hypothesis is that the Aristotelian causes are 
primary and absolutely intelligible, in the sense that we have a direct experience 
of these kind of causes, and any kind of causation not related to direct experience 
will be reduced to the primary causes, in particular to the efficient causation. It is 
the substitution of a distributed causation by an Aristotelian causation, the 
efficient causation that we call a mythical explanation.  
To begin seeing the implications of this definition, let’s recall Schelling´s 
model again. Let us suppose, once more, that a local and distributed causation led 
to a state of segregation. Then, to the individuals attached to a cohesive group, 
segregation appears as given. We could ask a question to one of them:‘ What do 
you think was the origin of this segregation?’ Surely everybody will agree that it 
will be implausible an answer of the type: ‘It seems to have been generated by the 
accumulation of many interactions of individuals, all non-segregationist’. It is 
more plausible to consider other answers: ‘our community has decided so’, or 
‘each one of us has decided so because we don’t like them around and they don’t 
like us’.  
Notice, first of all, that this answer supposes the use of a majority rule when it 
is an opposite rule that is really responsible for the dynamics of the segregation 
model. Secondly, the important point in the answer can be the use of pronouns 
like ‘us’ and ‘we’, as well as the collective entity ‘the community’. In the case of 
the first answer it shows the replacement of a local and distributed causation 
(which no one can experience) by a single and global cause (the ‘community’, in 
this case), that completely satisfies the intelligibility, because that cause works in 
the same way that a local cause works, i.e. as an efficient causation - a cause that 
an individual can experience. In the second case the answer shows the 
replacement of nonlinear interactions by an explanation based on linear ones, 
using the independent sum of segregation behaviors, being a fact that everyone 
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also experience each one of those behaviors. In both cases, we see the replacement 
of a distributed causation by a global cause that works as an efficient causation. 
Critical transitions of phase  
 
Our implementation of Schelling’s model is a first illustration of the emergence 
of global states from local interactions, a process upon which is founded the 
search of intelligibility by the use of mythical explanations. But the model is 
insufficient to deal, in all its generality, with the emergence of global macroscopic 
states that accompanies the formation of myths. We need to be guided by a larger 
theory, the theory of critical phenomena and cellular automata. As briefly as 
possible, we will present certain well-known aspects of these theories that are 
important for the understanding of the argument in the remaining sections of this 
article. (Cf., for instance, Fischer 1983 for a detailed account of critical 
phenomena.) 
A magnetic material, composed by elementary magnetic moments, called 
spins, provides a good example of a critical phase transition. A spin can just point 
to two opposite directions of space. Interactions between spins favor an ordered 
state where they are all parallel, pointing to the same direction (the so-called 
ferromagnetic phase). On the contrary, thermal energy favors a disordered state 
where the spins point randomly to those two directions of space (the so-called 
antiferromagnetic phase). The behavior of the system can depend on an external 
parameter, the temperature, that can take a critical value at which the system 
exhibits sets of ordered spins inside random spins, which, at their turn, are inside 
sets of ordered spins, and so on, so that the system is scale-free at the critical 
point. For our purposes, the main and generic fact pointed out by the theory of 
critical phenomena is that there are two great phases – a phase of order and a 
phase of disorder or entropy- separated by a critical or unstable point. 
We will not enter the mathematical and physical details that justify the 
statement that the behavior of a magnetic material is a universal behavior, and that 
it is that same behavior that can be found in a kind of discrete dynamical systems, 
called cellular automata. As a matter of fact, the above implementation of 
Schelling’s model was a particular cellular automata. More generally, and thanks 
to the work of S. Wolfram (Wolfram 1994), it is known that the totality of cellular 
automata can be classified into four large classes: the classes I and II of cellular 
automata, where the automata converges to invariant final states (stable fixed 
points and cycle limits, respectively), the class III, a class of disorder (chaotic 
states and states of larger entropy), and, finally, the class IV, a class of transition 
between II and I, on the one side, and III, on the other. The class IV is a critical 
class where we can see the emergence of correlations between the automata. So, 
again, we have two great and universal phases mediated by a critical one: a phase 
of order in which elements – each element - of the system dependent on each 
other, a phase of disorder in which the elements are independent, and a critical 
region in which each element can ‘communicate’ with other elements situated 
very far away (that is, at a distance greater than the distance of local interactions) 
(cf., for example, Langton 1990).  
We think that this kind of universal behavior can lead to a better understanding 
of the emergence of mythical explanations. We will start now with a qualitative 
example. 
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The wave and the panic  
 
Let’s imagine a summer afternoon in a region mainly occupied by tourists. For 
example, the Algarve, in the south of Portugal. At a certain moment each 
individual follows with his own routine, contacts with a relatively reduced number 
of other individuals, and nobody cares too much of what’s going on outside that 
chosen place of good holidays. In a calm summer afternoon at the beach, we can 
appropriately say that the individuals are in a situation of relative independence, 
because the behavior of each one is not too much constrained by others.  
Let’s now suppose the sudden appearance of a rumor, the rumor that a 
catastrophe of oceanic origin approaches. For example, the rumor that the sea is 
beginning to move dangerously towards the beach – a giant wave! Although this 
point is an important one, we will suspend for the moment the question of 
knowing if the rumor was groundless or not. Whatever the case, there is a fact that 
is unquestionable. As the new, no doubt, spreads, the individuals begin to be more 
and more tied up to each other. In particular, everybody begins to be oriented 
towards the same source, for example, trying to see if the water in fact moves as a 
giant wave. And even if no one actually sees the wave, each one tends 
immediately to try to find out if in fact another one sees the phenomenon. Each 
individual tends to be very tied up to others. The rumors that say that somebody 
saw, and where it was seen, the phenomenon, increase, also increasing the 
dependence among the individuals. It is not the dependence related to the one 
individual supposed to have seen the giant wave, but rather the dependence related 
to the network that, from neighbour individual to neighbour individual, diffuses 
the new and places everybody in the same phase. Let’s finally suppose that an 
additional rumor effectively generates a situation of panic: a general escape. (On 
panic, cf. Dupuy 1991.) In a real, quite recent event of this kind, and across a 
region of about 80 Km in the Algarve, we were able to actually see a massive 
escape from the beach.  
Now, the general escape is no less than the climax of a tendency that was 
growing by accumulation. What happens in a process that leads to panic? Each 
individual tends to be more and more dependent of the words and actions of 
others. It is not a dependence to others ‘in general’, but to those individuals in the 
same physical neighbourhood and with whom the interaction is a local one. Each 
individual tends to imitate his neighbours; each one feels the pressure of his 
fellow neighbours. For example, looking at when and where he looks at. Fleeing 
when and where he flees. At the moment of the utmost widespread panic, each 
individual tends to follow the escape of those that he sees to flee. Clearly, this is a 
local process based on imitation: I imitate somebody, and the one behind me 
imitates me at his turn, in a process that, from nearest to nearest, accelerates itself. 
It can become infinitely fast and, at that moment, it happens that all individuals, 
without being aware of, are in a state of global coordination: if a rumor, maybe 
definitive, appears, the general escapade follows. It is a mechanism of positive 
retroaction by which the tendency to the escape spreads increasingly, becoming 
infinitely fast when the critical state of global coordination is reached. 
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In the example under analysis, it can be said a posteriori that it was a 
groundless rumor, and that in fact an imminent catastrophe didn't exist.3 That 
statement reinforces the local nature of the mechanism that led to the panic, 
because, in fact, there was no real cause. On the contrary, in the case of a very real 
cause (we could see beyond any doubt a giant wave), the coordination or 
everybody’s common phase - the escape - would not have its origin in local 
interactions, but rather in a real event external to all individuals. This is an 
important observation because it suggests a better understanding of the dynamics 
of the process. The situation of panic is interesting because, evidently, the 
individuals don't attribute the general movement of escape to the local interactions 
but rather to ‘the cause’. Some real cause for the escape must exist; it must exist 
an efficient cause. So, if, finally, it is verified that the movement of the ocean was 
a kind of vision induced by others, each one would propose an a posteriori 
explanation for the escape: it was due to the rumor, to what somebody said or 
supposedly saw. The individuals recover the intelligibility in that way, because 
somebody diffusing one rumor is an intelligible material and efficient cause that 
can perfectly explain the collective movement of escape. But it is clear that what 
the individuals do not perceive, because they can’t, is that the ‘true’ cause does 
not exist, that is, the fact that it is a distributed cause resulting of multiple local 
interactions that have led the system to a state of global coordination.  
The structure of mythical explanations can now be better understood. It was 
underlined that the individuals cannot experience a distributed causation: that type 
of causation does not exist anywhere because it does not have the qualities of 
reality and existence, characteristics of an efficient cause. But the individuals have 
a direct experience of a local interaction. The local interactions are in fact 
‘suffered’ by each one; the pressures are very real. In our example, they consist of 
the ‘latest news' that each one transmits concerning the approaching of the wave, 
or in that direct pressure making me look at when and where somebody else looks, 
and then flee. All these are direct pressures that anyone can experience.  
There is, in fact, a reason, a direct cause of the escape, that is not exactly the 
one imagined by the individuals – a real wave or a rumor that somebody diffused - 
but one of a similar nature. It is this similarity that explains how the mythical 
explanation appears, that is, how the phenomenon is explained by the hypothesis 
of a single and external cause. The single cause is a cause that reproduces, in an 
invariant way, the type of direct – but not distributed – causation among 
individuals, only it is imagined as exercising globally on everybody the type of 
direct causation that each one exercises on a neighbour. The single cause is then 
considered to be the cause of the individual’s global coordination.  
This is particularly clear in our example. What leads the individuals to the state 
of escape? The belief in a giant wave. However, they had not been driven to 
escape by the real vision of a giant wave (they didn't see any), but due to the 
accumulation of local pressures, of local interactions between a large number of 
people.  
We can now arrive to a consequence that follows from the interactions 
generating mythical explanations: when entangled in situations of strong 
interdependence, the individuals can be led to lines of behavior that they would 
                                                          
3 The author of this article, which was in the Algarve in the summer of 1999, 
can testify that, indeed, there was no giant wave. Neither the large number of 
TV stations dispatched to cover the event were able to record anyone. 
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never follow if they were independent. In the case of the wave, they were taken to 
a line of behavior that, considered individually, none of them would carry out, 
unless pressed by a very real wave. If we imagine that each individual was 
completely isolated, it is plain that each one would just flee if he really saw a giant 
wave. What could have been the real cause of an individual and independent 
behavior replaces, in a mythical way, the distributed causation that truly started 
the panic. A mythical explanation is always based on linear interactions. In other 
terms, we can say, once more, that a mythical explanation consists in the 
substitution of the result of the nonlinear interactions between the individuals - 
substitution based on the efficient and local causation that each one can 
experience - by an imaginary and single global cause that, acting independently on 
each individual, still has the form of that efficient causation. This could be seen as 
the construction of the imaginary starting from the real.  
R. Girard and the emergence of myths  
 
Last section’s implicit hypothesis was that the onset of panic is very far from 
being a particular phenomenon. It points to quite general mechanisms, precisely 
those made clear by the theory of dynamical systems. We will now show that the 
very same mechanisms guide the work of René Girard. Our main purpose is not to 
elaborate upon that point, but we must stress out that the intuitions and analyses 
guiding the intellectual work of Girard’s, receive full confirmation, at theoretical 
level, from contemporary approaches to the study of dynamical and complex 
systems. Having said that, it is more important to see how that work, a work that 
has the analysis of myths as main subject, elucidates the mechanisms of mythical 
explanations. 
As it is well known, Girard’s work is a work about the origins, about the 
mechanisms present at the formation and critical breakup of human communities. 
That origin is not an absolute point, in the sense that a true explanation can only 
be reached when the point of origin is moved and made dependent on the 
mechanisms that place as derived what was taken as origin: if Girard’s work is at 
the intersection of mythology, anthropology and psychology, it points to biology 
as a subsequent level of explanation. We do not follow here that whole derivation, 
placing our starting point at the level of the human communities instituted by the 
myths that always accompanied its evolution. In the subject of myths, Girard 
wants to show which function do the sacrifice rituals carry out, and his hypothesis 
is that they perform a real social function. It is in this context the he insists that the 
sacrifices narrated by myths really happened (Girard 1972). In that sense, a myth 
is not a ‘myth’ in the common sense of the word, but the narrative of a real event.  
What is then, in general lines, the purpose of sacrifice according to Girard? Its 
purpose consisted, and continues to consist, in blocking the infection processes of 
contagion and mimetical diffusion. Among these processes, Girard stresses the 
dynamics of violence. Leaving aside its origin in animal behavior, we can begin 
by imagining a community where violence is, at a certain moment, absent. Life 
goes on in a well-ordered way, and we can say that the individuals are then 
independent. Let’s now suppose that, due to some reason, violence starts at some 
place. We are referring to communities where most individuals have direct or 
indirect connections with almost everyone. In this kind of network, it is easily 
immediately understood that violence cannot but spread from neighbour to 
neighbour. Because it is, in fact, of the nature of violence to appeal to violence: 
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‘violence pulls to violence' (Girard 1972). The local spreading of the violence 
starting at an initial focus means that the individuals are less and less independent 
and become more and more tied up. Following Girard’s terminology, the 
individuals become more and more doubles of each other: they imitate each other, 
through a process that grows until the generalized violence spreads from any point 
to any point of the system. The individuals are going from an independence phase 
to a dependence one, in which everybody is at the same phase of violence.4 
According to Girard, sacrifice rituals are instruments that block the spread from 
any point to any point of a process that is contagious. It is important to understand 
that they portray the mythical ritualization of a dynamics. That is, we should not 
assume that, gathered in an assembly, the individuals would sign an agreement (an 
‘original social contract’) to institute a sacrifice with such a function. The 
sacrifice, and its ritualization, is caused by a local process from which will 
emerge, by mythical replacement, the sacrificed victim's central figure. We won’t 
mention here the myths analyzed by Girard that support this conclusion. That 
analysis shows what the logic of events indicates: the sacrificed victim represents 
the passage of an independence phase to a phase of common dependence. What 
happens is that each one’s pressures are replaced by an invariant of all those 
pressures. This invariant is the Other of each individual, that is, it is the Other of 
them all, and so, their violence towards each other will be exteriorized in the 
violence of all individuals against the sacrificed individual. At that moment, the 
individuals are fully ‘in phase ' and they feel themselves as a community. Girard 
writes:  
 
D’où vient cette unanimité mystérieuse? Dans la crise sacrificielle, les 
antagonistes se croient tous séparés par une différence formidable. En 
réalité, toutes les différences s’effacent peu à peu. Partout c’est la même 
haine, la même stratégie, la même illusion de différence formidable dans 
l’uniformité toujours plus complète. A mesure que la crise s’exaspère, les 
membres de la communauté deviennent tous les jumeaux de la violence. 
Nous dirons nous-mêmes qu’ils sont les doubles les uns des autres. 
(Girard 1972, 121) 
 
It is when the individuals feel more different that they are in fact more and 
more close to each other. This erosion of differences, of real independence, 
implies that correlation spreads locally, until a state of global coordination 
emerges – the state of maximum uniformity in which the individuals ‘are all 
pointing in the same direction’. Girard continues:  
 
Si la violence uniformise réellement les hommes, si chacun devient le 
double ou le ‘jumeau’ de son antagoniste, si tous les doubles sont les 
mêmes, n’importe quel d’entre eux peut devenir, à n’importe quel 
moment, le double de tous les autres, c’est à dire l’objet d’une fascination 
                                                          
4 One should stress again that the descriptions of Girard concerning the spread 
of the violence could be fully justified, at theoretical level, by contemporary 
graph theory, in particular by random graph theory. For an excellent and up-to-
date account cf. Albert and Barabási 2001. That theory could be used to show 
that the violence must spread when a critical point is reached. 
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et d’une haine universelles. Une seule victime peut se substituer à toutes 
les victimes potentielles…(Idem, Ibidem). 
 
The sacrificed victim appears when the community reaches the critical point, at 
which each one is the double of each other. Now, if the sacrificed victim is no 
more than the invariant of these multiple interactions, then, the individuation, the 
referent of that invariant, can only be arbitrary: any member of the community 
can, potentially, become the universal object of that violence. 
This arbitrariety can also be seen in another way. In the absence of interactions, 
it is not plausible to think that the specific sacrificed victim is really the cause of 
the crisis of each individual taken separately, just as, in the example of the wave 
in the section above, no individual would be lead to the escape if the interactions 
or a real wave were absent. But the interactions do exist, and so the victim 
emerges as a non-anticipated consequence of those interactions. Now, given the 
fact that, by sacrifice rituals, community puts an end to violence, the conclusion 
can only be that the victim was indeed the individual cause of the widespread 
violence. We really have a myth here: the replacement of a distributed causation 
by an exemplary cause that has the form of an efficient cause.  
The last statements can be confirmed by Girard’s theory of the scapegoat. 
Many of the countless historical examples of scapegoats (cf. Girard 1982, for 
examples) are based on the ideia that the scapegoat is the cause of social 
disorders. That cause has a sort of infectious nature: the scapegoat generates the 
social disorder by sending a kind of fluid or virus that contaminates the whole 
community. The scapegoat is an efficient cause that uses a material cause that 
spreads in a field with contagious properties; that shows the relationship between 
a principle of local causation and the emergence of an efficient cause. In fact, the 
scapegoat typifies the mechanism of replacement of a distributed causation by an 
efficient causation. This last type of causation is absolutely primary: ‘given the 
fact that there is no other cause for the violence than the belief in an exterior and 
single cause [en une cause autre], it is only needed that this universality be 
embodied in a real individual, the scapegoat, which becomes the other of 
everybody’ (Girard 1982, 128, emphasis added).  
However, we repeat, the genesis of the scapegoat implies that the system has 
reached a critical point –each one is the double of each other–, and then any small 
disturbance of the system leads to a phase of order. The individuals don’t 
understand, because they can’t, that they are responsible for that order (i.e., 
‘disorder’, in Girard’s terminology), and so, the explanation of that state can only 
be reached by some exterior cause. In other words, it is at this moment that the 
control is reestablished: the social disorder is fully explained through a 
transcendent entity. In reality, ‘the crowd throws on impotent victims the 
responsibility for its own state of crisis, a responsibility that however does not 
belong to an individual or to a specific group of individuals. This way collectivity 
offers itself the illusion of reestablishing a sort of control of its destiny.’ (Girard, 
1978, 184). Mechanisms of single causation, with linear and modular separation, 
are indeed the archetypical models of control (cf. Machuco Rosa 2002). Within 
the logic of sacrifice, it is the recognition of a single and external cause, the 
exemplar substitute of a distributed process, that allows the community to 
abandon its state of crisis. The final conclusion drawn by Girard is, obviously, that 
the scapegoat can finally be ritualized as a beneficial entity, because his sacrifice 
has reestablished the social order. 
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Let’s summarize. In Girard's theory we can detect two great phases separated 
by a critical point; the ritualization of the sacrifice is a summary of that dynamics. 
First, an independence phase in which the individuals follow ‘a normal life.' 
(‘social order’, in the ordinary sense of the word; ‘disorder’ in the sense of 
information theory, cf. below). Then follows a process of local contagion that 
converges to a critical point where there are only doubles. This is an unstable 
point followed by a phase of disorder (‘order’, in the sense of information theory). 
But nobody is fully aware of that dynamics, so intelligibility and control are 
reestablished by the illusion of the existence of an external and efficient cause, the 
scapegoat. We conclude that the scapegoat has a mixed nature: he is the 
exteriorization of the tension between order and disorder, present at the critical 
point, therefore being the responsible for both order and social disorder 
Imitation in financial markets  
 
The theory of sacrifice proposed by Girard describes a dynamic process that is 
critically separated by two great phases: a phase that we have called an 
‘independence phase’ and a ‘dependence phase ' in which the individuals are 
synchronized or aligned. Given the fact that the individuals only have a local 
representation of the state of the system, the consequence is that the critical point 
is exteriorized under the form of an efficient cause that is imagined as acting 
globally on everybody. We will now see that it is still that same idea, in part 
mathematically formalized, that reappears in another type of complex social 
systems. We refer to the Economy, which is now more and more thought in 
‘mimetic’ terms. 
That was not always the case. In fact, the theory that has dominated the field of 
economics for over almost a century, the so-called ‘neoclassical theory’, is based 
on the crucial assumption of agent’s independence. They do not compare to each 
other; they do not imitate each other. We will not enter into the details of 
neoclassical theory, but two fundamental aspects should be referred. 
The first one concerns the general mechanism of formation of prices as 
proposed by Leon Walras and formalized later. According to Walras (Walras 
1954), the economy tends to a regime of equilibrium in which the total amount of 
the excess of demand (considered in all markets) will be zero. The question is then 
to know how such an equilibrium can be reached. As Friedrich Hayek noticed 
many years ago (Hayek 1946, 91), that problem could be solved if all its data (the 
values of each good in each market) ‘were known to a single mind’. Actually, 
Walras proposed a solution of the same kind through the fiction of the auctioneer. 
The auctioneer is a sort of omniscient being that, provided with the knowledge of 
all demands and all offers in all markets, acts in the following way: it 
systematically adjusts the prices, increasing those where there is an excess of 
demand (so the prices go down), and decreasing those where there is an excess of 
offer (so the prices go up). That mechanism can be formalized by a system of 
differential equations (cf., for example, Kehoe 1987), but mostly important is to 
underline that the fiction of the auctioneer means that the prices are at equilibrium 
before any real exchange between the agents takes place. Any real exchange 
begins when the system is already at equilibrium, and so the prices appear to all 
economic agents as given. The economic agents don’t interact, they don’t 
communicate directly. Their only relationship is an indirect one, a relationship 
through the given prices: they just communicate to each other through the 
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universal and transcendental mediator represented by the auctioneer. This one is 
present to all agents, but these do not have any direct relationship. 
We then see that a mythical replacement allowed the economy to become a 
‘rigorous discipline’. The mythical explanation consists in the replacement of the 
decentralized actions of the agents, which are the real cause of prices, by the 
figure of a single mind, the universal and transcendental mediator that announces 
to everybody the result of his calculus. In that sense, neoclassical economy is a 
theoretical elaboration of the way by which the agents could explain a reality that 
appears to them as given. But the auctioneer does not only represent the 
construction of a body of theoretical knowledge by mythical replacement. He is 
also the single mind that completely determines the economic reality - technically, 
that hypothesis means that Walras assumed that the stable equilibrium point of 
prices is unique, and so ruling out the possibility of multiple fixed points in 
competition. However, that hypothesis leads precisely to the disregard of any 
interactions between the agents, that is, it implies considering economy as a non 
complex system (cf. Arthur, Durlauf and Lane 1997, for a panoramic of the 
models of economy as a complex system). As we would point out again, 
economy’s neoclassical theory concerns how the individuals would act if they 
were independent.  
The second aspect that should be mentioned refers to the theory of rational 
expectations and one of its extensions, the hypothesis concerning the efficiency of 
capital markets. The theory of rational expectations would deserve a detailed 
treatment (cf. the classic presentation in Lucas 1978, and a good discussion in 
Sargent 1993), but it is enough to say that it is a theory that supposes the 
economic agents as rational, possessing a model that allows them to estimate the 
future prices, all of them following that same model identically (each one being 
aware that everybody else follows that model), and all of them in possession of 
the total relevant information. Based in these premises, the agents form their own 
expectations concerning the value of a stock.  
Now, the so-called efficient market hypothesis states that in an informally 
efficient market, price changes must be unforecastable if they are properly 
anticipated, i.e., if they fully incorporate the expectations and information of all 
market participants. We have an apparent puzzle: the more efficient the market, 
the more random the sequence of price changes generated by such a market must 
be, and the most efficient market of all is one in which price changes are 
completely random and unpredictable. The reason, of course, is that the agents are 
trying to make a profit from the information they get when an announcement 
randomly arrives to the market. Thus, if all the well-informed agents see that a 
stock is now overvalued, they immediately incorporate that information in the 
construction of prices and sell, which makes prices return to their ‘fundamental 
value’. Prices will always randomly oscillate around their ‘fundamental value’. 
The consequence will be that the ‘chartists strategies', the ‘technical analyses' –
observation of eventual patterns in the graphs of temporal evolution of prices, 
projection of past trends into future ones, patterns in trading volume, and so on – 
are condemned to be overcome by strategies in terms of ‘fundamental analysis’. 
The efficiency-market hypothesis describes a situation of double independence. 
On one side, the future value of a stock is not determined by its past values, and 
on the other each agent bases its expectations on the fundamental value of the 
stock, not in the analysis of other agent’s intentions. From that hypothesis of 
independence, it follows that the change of prices can be represented by a 
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Gaussian normal distribution (cf., for example, Fama 1970). That result gives a 
definitive meaning to the agent’s independence: if they are independent, then the 
demand function can be mathematically represented by random and identically 
distributed variables.  
However, many empiric data shows that the Gaussian distribution is far from 
being an accurate description of the evolution of the indexes of stock markets: the 
deviation is in general superior to the standard deviation expected in a Gaussian 
distribution, that is, there is a higher probability for extreme values. In fact, 
several numeric details (cf., e.g., Farmer, 2000) lead to the conclusion that the 
independence hypothesis and the Gaussian distribution have to be abandoned.  
How to replace them? Our purpose is not to analyze the models of the stock 
markets from the point of view of its empirical adequacy, but rather as examples 
of the consequences that follow the rejection of the independence hypothesis. In 
other terms, we will see how financial markets can be regarded as complex 
systems in which there are global states distributively caused by local interactions. 
In fact, in the last years several models were proposed that, in order to explain the 
departure from the values of a normal distribution, assume the imitation as the 
main mechanism of interaction between investors (cf. Cont and Bouchoud 1997, 
Johansen and Sornette 1999, Iori 2000, Kaizoji 2000). These are no longer 
independent and communicate directly. If so, we can expect that the formal 
models should display critical behavior. That can be shown selecting one of these 
formal models, the model proposed by Andreas Johansen, Didier Sornette and 
Olivier Ledoit (Johansen, Sornette and Ledoit 1999). 
The purpose of the model is not only to explain the departure from a Gaussian 
distribution, but mainly the apparent existence of crash’s precursors, designated 
by financial analysts as oscillations of periodic logarithm: the curve of prices 
exhibits a sequence of minima and maxima in the temporal succession tn , such 
that (tn+1 - tn) / (tn - tn-1) = , where λ λ is a constant factor of scale. That geometric 
contraction converges to an accumulation point that is an unstable critical point at 
time tc, the time of the crash. At that moment, a massive sell off occurs, which 
represents a great deviation from the ‘normal’ situation of the markets, the 
existence of an approximate equilibrium between sell and buy orders. 
To explain those crash precursors, D. Sornette and co-workers have offered the 
hypothesis that each financial agent (an individual investor or a mutual fund) acts 
locally: he bases his decision on chats, on several relationships with some known 
fellows and on the available news. The hypothesis is that each agent acts through 
local imitation. That imitation process can be formalized assuming that the crash 
hazard rate h(t) designates the probability for a crash to happen in the following 
lapse of time, if it has not happened yet. So, h(t) means the probability for the 
occurrence of a massive sell off. The dynamics of the crash hazard rate follows 
the equation: 
 
1 >       withC = 
dt
dh
h δδ     (1) 
 
where C is a constant. The exponent 1 > δ  quantifies the number of agents that 
interact with a given agent, and it’s the existence of those interactions that causes 
the increase of h(t). Under the fundamental condition 1 > δ , the integration of (1) 
leads to a critical point, the integration being: 
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As said, it is not very important for our purposes to evaluate to what extent the 
model is really capable of predicting a crash. Neither it is important to present 
here the additional economic details of the model. The essential point is that it 
shows a quite general situation: a competition between two opposite phases, a 
tension that explains the existence of critical transitions of phase.  
So, if we eliminate the imitation, there is a phase in which the agents act 
accordingly to an objective and common exterior reality; in short, accordingly to 
the ‘fundamental value’ of the market. That is the phase of equilibrium between 
buying and selling. In the language of information theory, it is a phase with a 
maximum of entropy: the probability of randomly picking a sell order approaches 
50%. It is the normal situation of the market, the situation without crises and in 
which the agents are independent. Following the intuitive sense of the word, in the 
section on Girard’s theory we called that state a state of ‘order'. But the word 
‘order’ now means ‘disorder’, and the inverse also applies. It is only a question of 
terminology: what Girard calls ‘disorder’ is now called ‘order’ in the language of 
the information theory. 
Therefore, in the absence of interactions there is a state of equilibrium. But, if 
interactions – the imitation process - are introduced, the probability of a crash 
grows exponentially. The model states that point very precisely, because of the 
condition  > 1 , which is a necessary one to get the critical point (the crash) to 
which (2) converges. With the increase of the probability of a crash, the agents 
become more and more aligned in a state of global coordination. That global 
coordination is marked by the increase of h(t), which means, for example, that the 
agents continue to buy, but under the expectation of larger returns, given that they 
are betting in a market in which a crash can happen. Obviously, the prices 
continue to increase until a critical point is reached, in which cascades of local 
imitation spread through the whole system causing the global coordination. At 
that moment, the agents are synchronized in the same phase and massive sell 
orders trigger the crash. The crash accomplished, the market returns to the normal 
situation of disorder. 
δ
What kind of behavior corresponds to the unstable fixed point that, not 
intentionally, is caused by the agent’s local imitation? The panic that happens in 
the crash. That panic is the invariant of multiple local actions. Just as we saw in 
the previous examples presented in this article, we see again that the individuals 
are led to lines of behavior that they would never follow if they were independent; 
remember that, in Sornette’s model, the crash hazard rate h(t) depends 
exponentially on the parameter that quantifies the number of interactions. To put 
the same idea in a reverse way, the individuals are lead to a kind of action that, if 
isolated, they would just carry out if very real causes forced them to that kind of 
action, for instance, if a deep economic crisis was in fact real. But when the stock 
market is ‘bullish’ the only foundations seem to be the local pressures that, in a 
distributed way, lead to the emergence of the global state of massive sell. 
Given what has been said so far, there is just one element still missing in this 
brief report concerning the emergence of mythical explanations in financial 
markets. Who are, then, the scapegoats of financial markets? No doubt that the 
institutional investors are often sophisticated people who also use very 
sophisticated mathematical and computational tools. However, the mythical 
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replacement also occurs. In certain cases (see, for instance, the currency crisis in 
Malaysia in 1997) a certain individual is clearly identified as the scapegoat. For 
example, one individual, George Soros, seems well fit to the role, even if studies 
show that he cannot have such an influence (cf. Conetti, Morris and Shin 1999). 
In another cases, the abrupt fall in the indexes is attributed to a certain 
announcement. For example, the condemnation for abuse of monopoly by the 
software company Microsoft would be responsible for the vertiginous fall of the 
index of technological stocks, NASDAQ, in April 2000. But this is a post factum 
explanation (cf. Johansen and Sornette 2000). As a matter of fact, ‘news’ are 
constantly ‘bombarding’ the market, and if we accept that a crash is produced by 
distributed local causation, it is true that one new can be the onset of a widespread 
sell off. But that new could be any new. Considering that, in the neighborhood of 
the critical point, the system is extremely sensitive to any small disturbance, one 
single notice, that could in fact be any notice, could trigger the crash. Only after 
the events, will the individuals try to rationalize - in terms of external, single and 
efficient causes - an outcome that has no single cause at all.5 
Finally, a last, and perhaps more relevant, example of mythical explanation in 
financial markets happens when the ‘speculators’, themselves considered as a 
collective entity, are the scapegoat: it is the ‘speculation’ – somebody else’s 
speculation - that turns out to be the scapegoat. That is, the distribute causation is 
reified, made a thing. Control and rationality are thus reestablished and the desire 
for explanation is finally satisfied. 
                                                          
5 Cf. Schiller 2000 for an analysis of the post factum explanations of 1929 and 
1987 crash’s. 
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